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cerned with whether Kosmas' credibility
was a crucial issue. The state's case depended on circumstantial evidence that
the defendant mistreated his wife and
that he tried to put out a contract for her
murder. The court said the evidence of
Kosmas' refusal to take a lie detector test
"cut to the heart of the defense." Id. at
597, 560 A.2d at 1142.
Finally, the curative effect of the jury
instruction was addressed. Judge McAuliffe opined that the instruction was insufficient to cure the substantial prejudice poisoning the jurors' opinion of
the defendant. He relied on Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) to
support this position. In that case, the
Supreme Court said, "[t]here are some
contexts in which the risk that the jury
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is
so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored." Kosmas, 316
Md. at 597, 560 A.2d at 1143 (quoting
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135).
Accordingly, Kosmas v. State indicates
that Maryland courts are becoming increaSingly intolerant of any evidence that
a defendant refused to take a polygraph
exam. This case also warns prosecutors
not to ask open-ended questions on direct examination unless they are confident that the information solicited will
not be substantially prejudicial to the
defendant.
-Gregory R. Smouse
Wilson v. Morris: EVIDENCE OF
PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT PATIENT
MONITORING POLICIES IS
ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE
THE STANDARD OF CARE
In Wilson v. Morris, 312 Md. 284, 563
A.2d 392 (1989), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that evidence of prior and
subsequent procedures for transporting
patients was relevant and admissible as a
consideration of the required standard
of care. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special
appeals, which had remanded the case
for a new trial.
Irene Ragland, appellee, brought an
action against a hospital director and a
county health department receptionist
as a result of personal injuries sustained
while she was a patient in the Western
Maryland Adult Day Care Treatment
Center ("the Center''). Wilson, 312 Md.
at 287,563 A.2d at 393. Ragland was returning from a doctor's office adjacent to
the Center when Ann G. Wilson, the re-

ceptionist, temporarily left Ragland unattended in a wheelchair at the top of a
handicapped access ramp. When the
wheelchair rolled down the access ramp,
Ragland fell forward on to the pedals and
fractured two vertebrae. Approximately
eighteen months prior to the accident,
and again, beginning the day after the accident, the Center's policy was for an attendant to remain with a patient while
transporting the patient between the two
facilities.Id. at 288, 563 A.2d at 393. At
the time of the aCcident, however, the
Center's policy was to have an attendant
accompany the patient to and from the
adjacent facility, but not to wait there
during the course of treatment. Id. at 288
n.5, 563 A.2d at 393 n.5. The trial court
refused to admit the evidence of the
Center's prior and subsequent practices
and concluded that such evidence was
irrelevant and inadmissible. Id. at 288,
563 A.2d at 393. The court of special
appeals reversed the trial court's ruling.
The intermediate appellate court held
that the Center's prior and subsequent
procedures demonstrated a pattern of
conduct which made those procedures
relevant and admissible. Id. at 288, 563
A.2d at 394 (citing Morris v. Wilson, 74
Md. App. 663, 668,539 A.2d 1151, 115354 (1988».
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to consider the law
under which evidence of prior and subsequent practices is admissible to prove
an alleged breach of the applicable standard of care. [d. at 289, 563 A.2d at 394.
The issue concerning the admissibility
of prior policy evidence was one of first
impression in Maryland. Consequently,
the court examined the case law of other
jurisdictions. In Welsh v. Burlington N.
R. R., 719 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. App. 1986),
an injured employee provided evidence
that a railroad company had abandoned
a policy that supplied employees with
carts for the purpose of loading propane
tanks. The Missouri Court of Appeals
held that the testimony regarding the
previous use of the carts to load propane tanks was relevant and probative on
the issue of whether the defendant was
negligent in failing to provide reasonably
safe employee equipment. Wilson, 317
Md. at 292, 563A.2d at 396 (citing Welsh,
719 S.W.2d at 797). In another case, a
woman tripped and fell upon a store
entrance floor mat. Id. (relying on Swiler
v. Baker's Super Market, Inc., 277
N.W.2d 697 (Neb. 1979». InSwiler, the
evidence revealed that on wet and rainy
days, it was the store owner's usual practice to tape the mat to the floor to protect

against slipping. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska ruled that the trial court propeclyallowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence relative to the store-owner's past
practice of taping or securing the mat in
question to the floor to prevent bulging.
Wilson, 317 Md. at 294, 563 A.2d at 396
(citingSwiler, 277 N.W.2d at 700).
Applying the holdings in Welsh and
Swiler, the court of appeals held the
prior practice of the Center was relevant
under the circumstances. [d. at 295, 563
A.2d at 397. The court also found the
evidence of the prior policy a material
fact to be considered in analyzing
whether the current policy was reasonably safe or whether other methods could
have been easily adopted. Id. Moreover,
the court stated that the trial judge
should consider the following test for determining whether prior policies should
be allowed as evidence:
1) The remoteness in time of the
prior policy;
2) The degree and significance of
the change in relation to the substantive issues presented;
3) The reasons for the change in
policy; and
4) The likelihood that any prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence
will outweigh the probative value of
the evidence.
Id. Thus, the court held that the Center's
prior policy of remaining with patients
taken for medical care was probative in
revealing the Center's knowledge and
perception of its duty to patients. [d. at
294-95,563 A.2d at 397.
Next, the court discussed whether
subsequent policy evidence was admissible to prove the scope of the duty of
care owed to the plaintiff. The court
recognized that there was "a standard of
care exception" to the general rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures when such evidence
"provi~es circumstantial proof that the
applicable standard of care had not been
met at the time of the accident or other
occurrence in question." [d. at 298, 563
A.2d at 395 (quoting 51. McLain, Maryland Practice: Maryland Evidence § 407.1
(1987, 1989 Supp.». The court's opinion stated that although a jury should not
consider the evidence of the immediate
change in patient monitoring policies as
an admission of negligence, it was admissible as evidence of the standard of care
required under the circumstances. Id. at
301, 563 A.2d at 400. Therefore, the
court ruled that the trial judge erred in
precluding counsel from offering the
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proper grounds for which evidence of
subsequent conduct should be admitted.
Id.
Finally, the Wilson court was careful to
reconcile its holding with the federal rule
on subsequent remedial measures. The
federal rule reasonably restricts the admissibility of such evidence to those situations where needed; that is, "when offered for another purpose such as providing ownership, control or feasibility
of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." Fed. R. Evid.
407. However, the court pointed outthat
the advisory committee's note to Federal
Rule 407 expressly lists "existence of
duty" as a valid basis for admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
Wilson, 317 Md. at 297 n.8, 563 A.2d 405
n.8. Thus, the court restated the principle that evidence of subsequent conduct should not be received as an admission of negligence or liability, but that the
standard of care exception is Maryland
law.ld. at 300-01, 563 A.2d at 400.
In Wilson, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that evidence of prior and
subsequent hospital practices were relevant and admissible to prove the alleged
breach ofthe applicable standard ofcare.
In addition, the court provided a test to
determine admissibility of such prior
evidence. However, the danger inherent
in following the Wilson standard is that
the allowability of prior or subsequent
evidence could provide indirect proof of
causation, or in effect, the exception
could "swallow the [general] rule" prohibiting the admission of such evidence.
Id. at 300,563 A.2d at 400 (quoting 5 L.
McLain, Maryland Practice: Maryland
Evidence § 407.1 (1987, 1989 Supp.».
Consequently, to allow both prior and
subsequent evidence might make such
evidence tantamount to an admission of
negligence, which the court of appeals
has expressly precluded.
-Stephen E. Cohill

Andresen v. Andresen: MARYlAND
COURTS NOT PERMITfED TO
REDETERMINE MARITAL PROPERlY
MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFfER FINAL
DIVORCE DECREE
In Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380,
564 A.2d 399 (1989), the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the power
of a court to modify a 1981 divorce decree, which would have allowed a former
spouse to share her former husband's
military pension. The court held that the
petitioner had not established any
grounds upon which the trial court's
28-The Law Forum/20.2

final judgment could have been
reexamined.ld. at 391, 564 A.2d at 405.
The court reasoned that there was no
authority under Maryland law which allowed a court to redetermine marital
property more than thirty days after the
decree became final except in cases of
fraud, mistake, irregularity or clerical
errors.ld. at 387,564 A.2d at 403. Thus,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's ruling.
Ruth and Ralph Andresen were divorced in Maryland on November 13,
1981. The divorce decree provided for
alimony and payment of attorney's fees
but did not include sharing Mr. Andresen's military pension benefits, which at
that time could not have been subjected
to division upon divorce according to
federal law.
On March 12, 1986, Ms. Andresen filed
a motion in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County to modify the 1981
divorce decree to allow her to share Mr.
Andresen's military pension. Because
Ms. Andresen's motion failed to specify
the procedural mechanism by which a
court could reopen the four-year-old
divorce decree, Mr. Andresen's motion
to dismiss was granted. Ms. Andresen
appealed, and the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari prior to a
decision by the intermediate appellate
court to consider whether Mr. Andresen's motion to dismiss was properly
granted. On appeal, Ms. Andresen argued that the changes in the law constituted sufficient justification to reopen
the enrolled divorce decree to allow
sharing of Mr. Andresen's military pension benefits. Id. at 383, 564 A.2d at 401.
The court of appeals began its discussion of the applicable law by reviewing
the changes in federal law. "On June 26,
1981, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that, as matter of federal law, courts
could not subject military retirement pay
to division upon divorce." Id. at 382,564
A.2d at 400 (citing McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210 (1981». After the Andresen's divorce became final in 1981, federal statutory law changed thereby allowing courts to consider military pensions
as marital assets for distribution in divorce proceedings.ld. In response to the
McCarty deCision, Congress enacted the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act (USFSPA) on September
8, 1982, effective February 1, 1983. The
Act was codified in pertinent part as 10
U.S.CA. § 1408 (c) (1). The USFSPA provided:
Subject to the limitations of this

section, a court may treat disposable
retired or retainer pay payable to a
[service] member for pay periods
beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property of the member
and his spouse in accordance with
the law of the jurisdiction of such
court.
317 Md. at 383, 564 A.2d at 401.
The court noted that the purpose of
the USFSPA was to overrule the McCarty
decision thereby allowing state law to
determine whether military pensions
were marital property. Id. at 384, 564
A.2d at 401. In addition, the court examined the legislative history which revealed that the USFSPA was retroactive
and allowed divorce decrees entered
between the date of the McCarty decision and the effective date of the USFSPA
to be reopened. Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that
under Maryland law, as construed in
Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437
A.2d 883 (1981), pensions, including
military pensions were marital property.
In addition, the Maryland General Assembly had confirmed, as now codified in
the Family Law Article, that a military
pension shall be considered as any other
pension or retirement benefit. Md. Fam.
Law Code Ann. § 8-203(b) (1984).
Pursuant to the USFSPA, the court
found approximately thirty-five state
courts had reopened divorce decrees.
However, these jurisdictions followed
Federal Rule 60(b)(5) and/or 60 (b) (6),
which allowed post-final judgment relief.
317 Md. at 386,564 A.2d at 402. Additionally, it was found that eight states
reserved equity or other broad powers to
reviseafinaljudgment. Id. at 386-87, 564
A.2d at 403. Although the majority of
courts had reopened finalized divorce
derees to permit a former spouse to
share military pension proceeds, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
Maryland law did not allow a Maryland
court to reopen a divorce decree, which
had been enrolled for more than thirty
days, except as provided by Maryland
Rule 2-535. Id. at 387, 564 A.2d at 403.
In support of its decision, the court of
appeals reiterated its earlier decision in
Platt v. Platt, 302 Md. 9, 485 A.2d 250
(1984), where it had held that the trial
court lacked the power to revise a fiveyear-old divorce decree. Andresen 317
Md. at 388, 564 A.2d at 403. In Platt, the
court had emphasized that there was no
authority under Maryland law which
would allow a re-examination of marital

